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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

STUART D. LUSCHEN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890186-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This an appeal from an Order Denying Motion to Vacate
Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court.

Defendant was

convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a second degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(j) (Supp.
1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying

the motion to withdraw the guilty plea after finding that the
plea was voluntary?
2.

Was defendant denied the effective assistance of

counsel?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(2) (Supp. 1989):
The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest and shall not accept
such a plea until the court has made the
findings: . . . (2) That the plea was
voluntary.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, on
April 11, 1988. This plea was entered in exchange for the State
dismissing Count II of the information which charged possession
of a firearm by a restricted person, a third degree felony.
Judge J. Dennis Frederick sentenced the defendant to the Utah
State Prison for a term of one to fifteen years and imposed a
fine of $5,000 plus $1,250 surcharge.
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on December
14, 1988. Judge Pat B. Brian denied the motion on February 13,
1989, holding that the plea was voluntary and defendant was not
coerced by the State.

Defendant moved to vacate the order

denying his motion to withdraw his plea on February 22, 1989.
Judge Pat B. Brian denied the motion on March 23, 1989.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant pled guilty to Count I, possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, in exchange for
dismissal of Count II, possession of a firearm by a restricted
person.

Defendant's attorney entered into plea negotiations with

the State after defendant informed him he wanted to plead guilty
and begin serving his sentence (R. 26). The State agreed to
dismiss the third degree felony charge in exchange for
defendant's guilty plea.

Defendant's attorney explained the plea

bargain agreement and the consequences of a guilty plea to
defendant (R. 27).
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The trial court asked defendant whether his plea was
voluntary and if he understood his plea (T. 3-5). Defendant
replied he was entering his plea voluntarily without any threats
or promises (T. 3). He stated that he understood the affidavit
and did not have questions for the court (T. 3). Defendant then
signed the affidavit and the court accepted his guilty plea (T.
4, 6). Defendant waived the statutory waiting period for
sentencing because he wanted to begin serving his sentence (R. 78).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's plea was voluntarily entered as the result
of plea bargaining.

The court questioned defendant about whether

his plea was voluntary and not coerced.

Defendant said it was

voluntary and no promises were made to him other than those
outlined in the affidavit.

Thus, the court met the Rule 11

requirement and correctly determined the defendant's plea was
voluntary.
Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel.

His attorney adequately represented defendant's

interests and defendant was not prejudiced by the attorney's
performance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA.
A court may not accept a plea of guilty unless the
-plea is voluntarily made.-

Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11(5)(b)

(Supp. 1989).

For a plea to be voluntary, a defendant must have

"a clear understanding of the charge" and must make the plea
-without undue influence, coercion, or improper inducement.M
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338-39 (Utah 1977).

In addition,

a defendant "must understand the nature and value of any promises
made to him."
1988).

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah

Thus, a trial judge should conduct an "on the record

examination of the defendant" to determine the defendant's
understanding of the nature of the charge.

Boykin v. Alabama,

395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969).
Defendant claims he pled involuntarily because of the
"State's threat to charge defendant with being a habitual
criminal" (Br. of App. at 9). He claims he pled guilty "only
because of the promise not to file the habitual criminal charge"
(Br. of App. at 6). Defendant maintains he would have "gone to
trial rather than plead guilty" if he had known the State had no
grounds to file a habitual criminal charge.

(Br. of App. at 3.)

However, as defendant admits, this allegation is unsupported by
the record (Br, of App. at 9).
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea
as a matter of right.
1987).

State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah

This Court should not interfere with the trial court's

decision on a motion to withdraw a plea unless the judge clearly
abused his discretion.
(Utah 1987).

State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424

The burden is on the defendant to establish good

cause for the motion, Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6(2)(a) (Supp.
1989), and to establish on appeal that the trial court abused its
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discretion in denying the motion, State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335,
336 (Utah 1977).

Defendant has failed to carry his burden in

both instances.
The record shows defendant voluntarily pled guilty to
the second degree felony.

Frank Mohlman, defendant's attorney,

stated that defendant admitted he committed the acts and wanted
to plead guilty prior to any plea bargain discussion (R. 26).
Mr. Mohlman approached the prosecutor for a plea negotiation (R.
26).

Once the State offered to allow defendant to plead to Count

I and dismiss Count II, Mr. Mohlman explained the plea bargain to
defendant and answered defendant's questions (R. 26-27).

Mr.

Mohlman never told defendant he would be convicted of a habitual
criminal charge (R. 27). Furthermore, Mr. Mohlman thoroughly
went over the affidavit with defendant and answered all his
questions concerning the contents of the affidavit.

Defendant

appeared to Mr. Mohlman to have a full understanding of the
contents and never claimed he was pleading guilty because of any
threat, coercion, or promise except what was agreed upon and is
in the affidavit (R. 28).
The trial judge questioned defendant to determine the
voluntariness of his plea (T. 5). Defendant stated he understood
the affidavit, that his plea was voluntary, and that no threats
or promises were made to him (R. 3, 5). Defendant admitted his
guilt and stated he was anxious to fulfill his sentence (T. 4,
8).
Furthermore, defendant's affidavit stated he was
entering his guilty plea in exchange for the State dismissing the

third degree felony charge and that there were M[n]o other
promises" (R. 8). In Hurst v. Cook/ 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1989), the defendant claimed he pled guilty to a second degree
felony but was sentenced for a first degree felony.

The court

upheld the conviction even though the information misnamed the
offense.

Ici. at 7.

The court stated that defendant's signed

plea document, executed on the day defendant pled guilty,
reflected the nature of the plea negotiation and the information
indicated the offense was a first degree felony.

Id.

Thus, the

defendant's plea was entered with knowledge of its legal
consequences.

Id.

In this case, defendant also signed an affidavit.

This

affidavit reflected the nature of the plea negotiation and was
discussed in court.

Thus, defendant was aware of the nature of

the plea bargain and voluntarily entered his guilty plea based on
the dismissal of the third degree felony.
Defendant has failed to prove his plea was involuntary.
He wanted to plead guilty to begin serving his sentence before
the plea negotiation began.

There is nothing in the record

supporting defendant's claim that he would not have pled guilty
if he knew the State could not file habitual criminal charges.
Since there is nothing in the record to support this allegation,
it should be disregarded.

State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1109

(Utah 1985).
Defendant also claims the court failed to discover if
his plea was voluntary because the court did not ask whether the
affidavit included the entire plea agreement of the parties;
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thus, his motion to withdraw the plea should have been granted
(Br. of App. at 10). This argument is without merit because the
Judge did ask if there were any other promises made to defendant
that were not in the affidavit (T. 3).
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Utah 1987),
the court stated that an affidavit may be used to promote
efficiency, but it is only a starting point for the judge. A
judge should still question the defendant concerning his
understanding of the affidavit and review it with the defendant
to fulfill the Rule 11 requirements.

.Id. Recently, however, the

Court held that an affidavit may be relied on to establish the
nature of plea negotiations.

Hurst, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7.

In

the present case, the trial court relied on an affidavit to
reflect the nature of the plea negotiation, but, the judge also
referred to the affidavit on the record and questioned
defendant's understanding of its contents (T. 2-3). Judge
Frederick asked defendant whether he had been threatened or
promised anything other than the promise to dismiss Count II (T.
3).

After defendant denied any threats or promises, he replied

he was acting of his own free will, and indicated that he
understood the consequences of the plea, the judge accepted his
guilty plea (T. 5-6). Thus, the trial court met the requirements
of Rule 11 and Gibbons on this issue.
Defendant argues this case as if the prosecutor made a
promise to defendant and then did not fulfill this promise.
App. Br. at 6-7.

See

He also cites the standard for evaluating a

pre-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea as if it applies to

this case.

See App. Br. at 7 citing State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d

1040 (Utah 1987).

Neither of these standards apply here.

First of all, this was a post-judgment motion to
withdraw and the liberal standard of Gallegos does not apply.
The standard of review here is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in finding no good cause and denying defendant's postjudgment motion to withdraw his plea.

See Utah Code Ann. §77-13-

6 (Supp. 1989), and State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Second, the prosecutor made no promise here that he
failed to fulfill.

At worst, perhaps, the prosecutor could be

accused of having made an illusory promise, i.e. a promise not to
file a habitual criminal allegation that held no benefit for
defendant but was made with the illusion of a benefit.
v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988).

See State

The record does

not support, however, a finding that the prosecutor made an
illusory promise.

Mr. Mohlman's affidavit states that the

possibility of a habitual criminal allegation was discussed and
that the State was looking into the possibility of such a charge
(R. 26 at 5). When a plea agreement was reached, however, the
State simply dropped its investigation into that issue (Ici. ).
Thus, no promise was made to defendant other than that the State
would not pursue that avenue.

Judge Brian specifically found

that defendant's plea was not coerced by any threat by the State
to file a habitual criminal allegation.

Findings of Fact

contained in Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, copy
in Appendix A.

This finding is not clearly erroneous based upon
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the record before Judge Brian.
Jolivet v. Cook,

P.2d.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1989);
,

, No. 880341, slip op. at 4

(Utah Aug. 22, 1989).
There is no indication in the record whether, in fact,
such a charge would have been possible other than defendant's
allegation that it would not.

This Court should not speculate as

to what the State would have found had it continued its
investigation into the issue.

It is clear that Mr. Mohlman

explained the "nature of an habitual criminal allegation" to
defendant (R. 26 at 5). Because this plea took place, at
defendant's request, so soon after Mr. Mohlman began representing
defendant, it is entirely conceivable that Mr. Mohlman relied on
defendant's own knowledge of his record to allow defendant to
make an intelligent decision whether such a charge would be
possible.

Defendant faults Mr. Mohlman for failing to

investigate his record; nevertheless, defendant was in the best
position to know whether he had a sufficient record in Utah or
other states to support the charge.

If the State's promise not

to further investigate the habitual criminal allegation was
illusory in light of the requirements for such a charge that were
explained to defendant, it is strange that defendant did not
point that out to his attorney at the time.
Significant are defendant's clear desire not to have
the court obtain a presentence report because it would establish
that defendant had a prior record, and his desire to proceed
immediately to sentencing even though counsel advised against it
(T. 8). Defendant chose to inform the court about some of his

record that the prosecutor already knew about.

These facts

undermine his claim that the prosecutor made an illusory promise.
The prosecutor very well may have discovered sufficient previous
convictions to support a habitual criminal allegation had he
continued his investigation.

There is nothing in the record to

support defendant's bare allegation that he had no further record
than he admitted at the time of his plea.

Moreover, the "rap"

sheet included in defendant's brief is not part of the record and
is not a basis for finding that Judge Brian abused his discretion
in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.

State v. Cook/ 714

P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) (references to matters outside the record
are inappropriate and irrelevant and will not be considered).
Defendant received exactly what he bargained for.

The

State did not further investigate or charge him with habitual
criminal and it dropped Count II of the information.

The fact

that the plea affidavit did not include a promise that defendant
actually received should not invalidate defendant's plea.
Because there is no record supporting defendant's claim that he
could not have been charged as a habitual criminal, this Court
should find that the lower court correctly exercised its
discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Moving beyond defendant's claim that the prosecutor
made an illusory promise, the State recognizes that Judge
Frederick did not fully advise defendant on the record at the
time of his plea of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.
Specifically, he did not advise defendant of his rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront
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the witnesses against him, see Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(c) (1989)
(the 1989 amendment renumbered but did not substantively change
this provision), nor that the State has the burden to prove the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, see Rule
11(5)(d).
P.2d

,

This Court recently stated in State v. Valencia,
, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),

that it will consider a Rule 11(5) omission raised for the first
time on appeal because it is "sufficiently manifest and
fundamental to be first raised on appeal . . .."

In this case,

defendant has failed to raise the issue even on appeal.

For this

reason, this Court should find that defendant has waived the
issue.
In the event that this Court finds the error to be
sufficiently manifest to consider it sua sponte, the error should
be reviewed in light of recent developments in the guilty plea
area.

Recent opinions of the Utah Supreme Court clarify State v.

Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), as it relates to the "record
as a whole" standard of review applied in a line of cases
beginning with Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985).

Based

upon the analysis below, even if this Court reaches the issue, it
should find that defendant's plea was valid.
Jolivet v. Cook,

P.2d

, No. 880341 (Utah Aug.

22, 1989), finds that although the trial judge did not strictly
comply with Rule 11 when Jolivet entered his plea,
'[t]he absence of a finding under [section
77-35-11] is not critical so long as the
record as a whole affirmatively establishes
that the defendant entered his plea with full
knowledge and understanding of its
consequences and of the rights he was

waiving.' State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405
(Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310f
311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d
309, 310 (Utah 1985).
Slip op. at 3-4.

Interestingly, Judge Billings of this Court sat

in place of Justice Stewart in Jolivet.

Decided prior to

Jolivet, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), also
applies the record as a whole test.

The Copeland court said:

The United States Supreme Court has said,
M
[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy fv. United States], 394 U.S. [459,]
470 . . . (emphasis in the original). We
think the most effective way to do this is to
have a defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
voluntariness.
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted).

These cases make it clear

that the test is whether the record as a whole establishes that
the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.

This Court's

holdings in Valencia, and State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), that "[sjtrict, and not just substantial,
compliance with the rule [that the examination must be by the
court on the record at the time of the plea] is required,"
Valencia, slip op. at 3, are inconsistent with recent Utah
Supreme Court rulings and should not be followed.
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Furthermore, this Mstrict compliance" test is also
inconsistent with Gibbons and other case law previously decided
by the Supreme Court.

A close reading of Gibbons reveals that

the Court was simply pointing out the much preferred and safest
method of determining the voluntariness of a plea.

The Supreme

Court had before it in Gibbons a transcript of the plea hearing,
740 P.2d at 1310-11.

Since the Court was able to review the

transcript and determined that the examination of the defendant
was inadequate, it seems likely that they would have remanded the
case with an order that the plea be withdrawn rather than
remanding for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness if they
intended to impose a rule of strict Rule 11 compliance.

This

viewpoint is reinforced by Copeland's clear statement that strict
Rule 11 compliance is not absolutely required when a guilty plea
is otherwise voluntary.
The State agrees that it is much preferred to have all
of these findings on the record at the plea hearing.

In some

cases, however, judges have overlooked certain aspects of Rule 11
at the time of the plea.

Where there is a record that

establishes that the defendant pled voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently, it seems unnecessary to invalidate a plea simply
because the judge overlooked parts of the Rule 11 examination in
court.
For example, in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986), the Court held that violations of Rule 11 do not
automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea.
stated:

The Court

A final word on the State's Rule 11
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that
was struck, the State has argued, in effect,
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty
pleas should always be voided when the trial
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well.
This position is short-sighted, for to follow
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse
than the wrong. If we were to hold that any
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the
resultant plea, even when the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced
after such a plea to attack their convictions
for purely tactical reasons, either by direct
appeal or by seeking habeas corpus long after
the fact. We have refused to overturn
convictions upon such challenges in the past
and we find no reason to encourage such
attacks in the future.
Overturning such convictions—which we
would have to do if we embraced the rationale
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion—would require the State
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably
long after the challenged guilty pleas were
entered and when the passage of time would
make reprosecution impractical, if not
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate
result would be to free a number of convicted
persons for nothing more than technical
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary
guilty pleas.
Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote and citations omitted).
Importantly, Gibbons did not overrule Kay.
to Kay, Miller, Brooks or Warner.

Nor did it even cite

Given the Utah Supreme Court's

recent reliance on the Miller, Brooks and Warner line of cases,
it does not appear that it was mere oversight that the Court did
not overrule these cases.

Instead, it appears that the record as

a whole test remains viable even after Gibbons.
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It may be argued that Copeland and Jolivet represent
cases where the Supreme Court was applying the record as a whole
test only because the pleas were entered before Gibbons was
decided.

This argument gains some support from the Court's

recent refusal to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons plea on the
theory that the Gibbons decision was a clear break with the past
and consequently not retroactive.
,

See State v. Hickmany

P.2d

, No. 880305, slip op. at 3, n. 1 (Utah Aug. 17, 1989).
Hickman, although troublesome, is not controlling when

closely analyzed.

First, it is a per curiam decision.

Second,

it ignores that the Court applied the record as a whole test in
Jolivet after stating the Gibbons requirements but without
distinguishing the case on the basis that it was a pre-Gibbons
plea.

The Court did not even cite Gibbons in Copeland, thus,

indicating no concern that Gibbons was inconsistent with its
holding.

Notably, the Court does not even state the date of

Jolivet's plea and mentions only in passing the date of
Copeland's plea without assigning any particular significance to
the date.

The Court's willingness to apply the record as a whole

test in these two cases without explaining that there was any
reason other than that it is the test to be applied indicates
that the Court believes just that—that the test is
voluntariness, not strict compliance with rigid Rule 11
recitations.

Were it otherwise, it is likely that the Court

would have overruled Miller, Kay, Brooks, and Warner; or at least
have expressly limited their application to pre-Gibbons cases.
The Court simply has done neither and this Court should

reconsider its rigid application of a strict Rule 11 compliance
standard with this line of cases in mind.
Evaluating this case under the record as a whole test,
this Court can find that defendant was advised of his
constitutional rights as Judge Brian found.

See Findings of

Fact, contained in Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
copy in Appendix A.

In the affidavit, which Judge Frederick

referred to in open court, defendant was fully advised of the
constitutional rights that he was waiving (R. 6-7). Judge
Frederick did not stop with asking defense counsel whether
defendant understood the affidavit (T. 2-3). He also
specifically asked defendant if he understood the affidavit and
whether he had any questions about it (T. 3). These references,
along with defendant's signature on the affidavit, establish that
defendant was adequately advised of the rights he was waiving.
Even though Gibbons instructs that trial courts should
not rely on defense attorneys to explain a defendant's rights to
him, this instruction was based upon the fear that defendants
simply come into court and do whatever their attorneys tell them
to do.

See, e.g., 740 P.2d at 1313.

In this case, however,

defendant did not simply stand mute and do what his attorney told
him to do without asking other questions of the court.

When

Judge Frederick was explaining that he was amending the affidavit
to reflect the actual charge to which defendant was pleading
guilty, defendant initially indicated that he did not understand
what Judge Frederick was doing (T. 5). The Judge explained
himself further and defendant then indicated understanding.
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If

defendant did not understand other parts of the affidavit, it
seems likely that he would have said so when asked.

Since he

said he understood it, this Court should find that it was
sufficient to advise defendant of the rights he was waiving by
pleading guilty.
Furthermore, the record indicates that defendant was
not new to the criminal justice system.

He had been previously

convicted of burglary in Utah and had other charges pending in
other states at the time of his plea (T. 9). From defendant's
pro se pleadings, it appears that he has a good command of the
English language and could have understood what he was reading in
the affidavit.

See R. 13-21, 23-4, 43-8, 54-62, 68-72.

Judge

Brian was not required to believe defendant's later claims that
he did not understand the affidavit when he stated on the record
at the time of the plea that he did understand it and, therefore,
Judge Brian's ruling was not clearly erroneous.

Jolivet v. Cook,

No. 880341, slip op. at 4 (Utah Aug. 22, 1989).
POINT II
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
A defendant is guaranteed the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.
(Utah App. 1989).

State v. Crestani# 771 P.2d 1085, 1089

To substantiate a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that "counsel's
performance was deficient [and] that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense."

State v. Grueberf 110 Utah Adv. Rep.

29, 33 (Utah App. 1989).

To establish prejudice a defendant must

show that a "reasonable probability exists that, but for

counsel's error, the result would have been different."

Ld.

If

both tests are not proven, "then defendant's ineffectiveness
claim is defeated."

Id.

Defendant claims Mr. Mohlman was ineffective because he
did not explain to him that the State could not file a habitual
criminal charge.

However, Mr. Mohlman did not investigate this

because it was not a part of the plea bargain.
Defendant indicated to Mr. Mohlman that he wanted to
plead guilty before the State offered its plea bargain (R. 26).
Mr. Mohlman then entered into plea negotiations with the State
(R. 26). Mr. Mohlman discussed the negotiations with defendant,
explained the nature of the habitual criminal allegations, and
answered his questions (R. 26-27).

Furthermore, Mr. Mohlman

examined the State's evidence and determined that sufficient
evidence existed so as to allow a jury to find the defendant
guilty of both charges in the information (R. 27). Mr. Mohlman
then discussed the evidence with defendant and gave him a
professional assessment of the evidence (R. 27). Also, Mr.
Mohlman explained the affidavit and the plea bargain agreement
with defendant (T. 2; R. 28). Thus, Mr. Mohlman represented
defendant's interests in court and in the plea negotiations.
Furthermore, Mr. Mohlman counseled defendant and provided him
with legal advice.

Advising someone to plead guilty to a crime

to which they admit guilt is not the basiis for an assertion of
deficient performance.

Mr. Mohlman provided adequate

representation and, therefore, the first test is not met.
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In addition, defendant was not prejudiced by Mr.
Mohlman's failure to inquire into the grounds for filing an
habitual criminal charge.

Defendant received a more lenient

sentence than he would otherwise have received because the third
degree felony charge was dismissed.

If this case were remanded

back to the lower court, that charge would be reinstated and
defendant would be subject to the possibility of a greater
sentence.

Thus, defendant benefitted from the plea bargain Mr.

Mohlman negotiated.

He also benefitted because, as noted above,

the State did not further investigate the possibility of the
habitual criminal charge.

The record does not disclose whether

the State would have found support for the charge had it
continued to investigate.

Defendant did admit that he had a

prior record and specifically declined a presentence report.

Mr.

Mohlman would have been justified in concluding that defendant
felt the possibility of being adjudged an habitual criminal was
real given that Mr. Mohlman did explain the nature of the
allegation to defendant.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £/&f~

day of August, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney GeneraJ
//SANDRA L. _
«-^ Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Alan K. Jeppesen, attorney for defendant, 85 North Main
Street, Tooele, Utah 84074 this jj&f
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day of August, 1989.
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MARK W. NASH #2365
Deputy Tooele County Attorney
Tooele County Courthouse
47 South Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
Telephone: 882-5550, Ext. 351

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

I

IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
Vs.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

)

STUART DEAN LUSCHEN,

I

)

Defendant.

I

Case No. CR88-020

)
T*

^F

^F

^F

^h ^F

^F

^F

I

This matter came on before the above-named court on the 13th day of February]
1989, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. The matter came before the Court on Defendant's
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and upon Defendant's Notice of Hearing which noticed thd
Motion For Hearing before the above-named court on February 13, 1989, at 10 a.mJ
Defendant was not personally present before the Court, he having failed to obtain an Ordeij
of Transportation from the District Court directing that he be transported to the heamg by thd
Department of Corrections.
County Attorney.

The State was represented by Mark W. Nash, Depaty Tooeld

The Court called the matter and Mr. Nash entered his appearance.

Afteit

ascertaining that Defendant was not present, the Coun inquired of Mr. Nash as 10 how the
State desired to proceed.

Mr. Nash responded that unless the Coun desired tc hear oral

arguments and receive testimony, the State was willing to submit the matter based upon the
memoranda and documents submitted by the parties. The Court thereupon made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered the following order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Coun, having reviewed the documents on file including the Guilty Plea
Affidavit of Defendant dated April 11, 1988, the transcript of the arraignment and sentencing
of Mr. Luschen which took place on April 11, 1988, the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and
Memorandum in support thereof filed by Defendant and the Memorandum in Response to
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea together with the Affidavit of Frank Mohlman
filed in support thereof by the State, as well as all other relevant documents, finds:
1.

j

That Defendant's entry of a guilty plea to the charge of "Possession ot

a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute" on April 11, 1988, was done voluntarily and
with a full understanding of the following:
a.

The elements of the offense to which Defendant plead guilty: and

b.

The minimum and maximum sentences that could have been

imposed for the offense to which Defendant plead guilty, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutively sentences; and
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c.

That any recommendation as to the sentencing from any person,

including the prosecutor, is not binding upon the Coun: and
d.

That by pleading guilty, the Defendant waived the following

constitutional rights:
i.

The right to testify in his own behalf; and

ii.

The right agains; compulsory self-incrimination; and

hi.

The righ; to confront and cross-examine the witnesses

against him: and
iv.

The right to a speedy, public trial by an impariial jury of

the County or District in which the offense was alleged to have
been committed; and
v.

The right to have compulsory process to compel the

attendance of witnesses in his own behalf; and
vi.
2.

The right to appeal.

The Coun further finds that Defendant's plea of guilty was rot coerced

by any part} nor was that plea of guilty entered in response to any promises or threats made
to or against Defendant by any party except by the promise of the State to move for dismissal
of Count II of the Information then pending against Defendant (Possession of a Firearm by
a Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony) in return for Defendant's plea of guilty to Count
I of the Informadon. The Coun specifically finds that Defendant's plea of guiliy was not
coerced by any threat of the State to file habitual criminal charges against Defencant should
3

he fail to plead guilty. The Court further finds that Defendant fully understood the details of
the plea agreement entered into and that the State complied with the promises it h*.d made as
pan of the plea negotiations. The Court also finds that there was a factual basis fcr the entry
of the guilty plea and that the Defendant was competent to enter that guilty plea.
3.

The Court further finds that Defendant was informed that his case could

be referred to the Department of Adult Probation and Parole for the preparation of a
presentence report should Defendant so request. The Court finds that Defendant voluntarily
and knowingly waived the preparation of such a report despite having been adv sed to the
concrary by his attorney.

The Court further finds that Defendant voluntarily waived the

minimum time in which to be sentenced and asked to be sentenced immediately following his
en.,7 of guilty plea.
4.

The Court further finds that Defendant was represented by competent

counsel during the entire arraignment and sentencing process and that the advice and
representations given to Defendant by his attorney were appropriate and accurate.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that all applicable rules
and case law were complied with by the Court in the receipt and acceptance of Defendant^
pica of guilty and in the sentencing of Defendant on April 11, 1988.

The Ccurt further

concludes that Defendant, by his knowing, intelligent and voluntary entry of a plea of guilty,
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waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him and that he may not now
raise such issues.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Court
hereby orders Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea denied.

The Judgment and

Sentence entered by Judge Dennis Frederick on April 11, 1988, shall remain in ful force and
affect and Defendant shall remain in the custody of the Department of Correctiors pursuant
to the provisions of that Judgment and Sentence.
DATED this / ? day of

f

*&At>

.^

*s»<^

, (.989.

^r.^L / ^7W/^^

District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea to Stuart Dean Luschen, Box 250, Draper, U:ah 84020,
postage prepaid, this I h day of

F^U^Z^

1989.
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